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Introduction
Community based natural resource manage-
ment (CBNRM) projects and policies generally 
aim to improve natural resources management 
and rural livelihoods while promoting demo-
cratic decision making and equitable benefit 
distribution at the local level. However, critics 
argue that CBNRM is susceptible to elite capture 
due to existing social structures that reproduce 
inequality and hierarchies within communi-
ties. Elite capture generally refers to a situation 
where elite groups dominate decision-making 
processes and monopolize benefits. 
This brief contributes to the debate by exploring
1) whether CBNRM is prone to elite capture, 
and if so 
2) whether the occurrence of elite capture is 
due to pre-existing social structures within 
communities, and/or to CBNRM policy de-
sign. 
How to reduce the risk and effects of elite capture  
under Community Based Natural Resource Management?
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Mohammed Nagar  
villagers in Medak, India.
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Ensure minority rights through reserving a minimum number of influential positions for 
them and through the prohibition of rules that significantly reduce their benefits from  
resource utilization without their prior consent and adequate compensation.
Ensure frequent, direct democratic elections of chairpersons and committee representatives 
through secret ballots.  
Ensure that key management functions and decisions are shared among and monitored by 
all the members of the management committee and ultimately the constituency. 
Bring marginalized groups into contact with equity promoting third parties such as govern-
ment institutions or independent NGOs. 
Policy Recommendations
This is done on the basis of a case study of Joint Forest Man-
agement (JFM) in Andhra Pradesh, India. The study included a 
review of the government’s official JFM policy documents and 
field work in a selected village, Mohammed Nagar, to trace 
the processes and outcomes of forest management from 
1997 when JFM was introduced to 2008. 
The case study focused on the following three questions: 
(1) To what extent has the Indian Government formally ad-
dressed the risk of elite capture in JFM? 
(2) What were the processes and outcomes of JFM in Mo-
hammed Nagar? 
(3) Were incidences of elite capture in JFM in Mohammed 
Nagar the result of pre-existing social structures and/or 
the implementation of JFM? 
Based on the results, this brief presents measures to reduce 
the risk of elite capture. 
(1)  To what extent has the Indian Government formally 
addressed the risk of elite capture in JFM?  
The orders issued by the Andhra Pradesh government on JFM 
indicate that the government had clear intentions to prevent 
elite capture. 
The orders on JFM include measures to: 
• Promote active participation of all segments of the com-
munity through mandatory representation of socially mar-
ginalized groups, such as lower castes and women, within 
committees; 
• Ensure transparency in community activities through man-
datory recording of forest management  plans, meeting 
minutes, and account books, and; 
• Prevent accumulation of power in the hands of particular 
people within the communities through elections of the 
core decision making body including the chairperson every 
three years. 
(2)  What were the processes and outcomes of JFM in 
Mohammed Nagar?   
Our case study shows that despite official intentions, elite 
capture did occur during the tenure of the first and second 
management committee from 1997 to 2007. 
• Elite groups including men of higher castes (who are 
wealthier and less dependent on forest products) gained 
influential positions within the decision-making body and 
monopolized benefits generated from forest management 
activities. 
• Socially disadvantaged groups such as lower castes and 
women (who are highly dependent on forest products) 
were marginalized in decision making. This resulted in new 
forest management rules that made them pay more user 
fees to the executive committee. These groups were also 
more frequently prosecuted and fined for rule violation.
In spite of the initial elite capture, marginalized groups suc-
cessfully claimed a leadership position during the election of 
the third management committee in 2008, where a lower 
caste was chosen as chairperson of the management com-
mittee. This happened because:  
• The formalized interactions under JFM gradually exposed 
the elite domination and exploitation to all in the commu-
nity. This enabled the lower caste groups to form alliances 
with other castes to resist and challenge the elites.
• An NGO working in the area played an important catalytic 
role in sensitizing the villagers about principles of equal-
ity and in establishing consensus among different groups 
with conflicting interests. 
• The JFM policies, which aimed at legitimizing equal rights 
of marginalized groups, actually created new awareness and 
opportunities for these groups to resist elite domination. 
Accordingly, our observations suggest that even though CB-
NRM is prone to elite capture, this is not necessarily a perma-
nent outcome.  
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(3)  Were incidences of elite capture in JFM in Moham-
med Nagar the result of pre-existing social structures 
and/or the implementation of JFM? 
Our case study suggested that the occurrence of elite capture 
was largely due to: 
• Existing social structures based on caste and gender that 
played a dominant role in framing collective action under 
JFM, reproducing and reinforcing elite capture. We also 
found that the occurrence of elite capture could partly be 
attributed to the implementation of JFM including:   
• Insufficient representation of marginalized groups in the 
decision-making body: The fact that higher castes in this 
community constituted the majority of the population 
enabled them to dominate the decision-making processes 
in the elected committee through majority rule.  
• Insufficient safeguarding policies for those adversely 
affected by new management rules: The most forest 
dependent people’s customary use of the forest was not 
adequately considered by the decision-making body in the 
rule making processes. Nor were low caste people suf-
ficiently compensated for the disproportional loss of forest 
derived benefits they experienced as a result of the new 
management rules.
• Lack of official democratic election rules: Due to unspeci-
fied election procedures, a local politician managed to 
manipulate the election process to nominate his candidate 
for the chairperson position at the second election. The 
politically nominated chairperson was thus more account-
able to the political elite than to his formal constituency. 
• Lack of checks and balances: Our case shows that power 
was accumulated in the hands of the chairpersons and 
that particularly the second chairperson misused these 
powers. Even in this case, no official procedures were 
available to oust a chairperson between official elections, 
e.g. at an extraordinary general meeting.  
Concluding remarks 
Our case study illustrates the inherent difficulties of trans-
forming pre-existing hierarchical social structures by way of 
introducing new formal measures under a CBNRM initiative 
such as JFM. In the long-term, however, centrally defined for-
mal measures may pave the way for increased opportunities 
for marginalized groups to justify their (new) rights to equal 
decision-making powers and a fair share of benefits. In order 
to harness this potential role of CBNRM, we propose the fol-
lowing four measures. 
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Village assembly  
meeting.
First, CBNRM initiatives should ensure minority rights, for 
instance, through reserving a minimum number of influential 
positions for minorities and through the prohibition of im-
plementing rules that significantly reduce their benefits from 
resource utilization without their prior consent and adequate 
compensation. 
Second, CBNRM initiatives should ensure direct democratic 
elections of chairpersons and committee representatives 
through secret ballots. Although direct elections are not suf-
ficient to guarantee a fair democratic process, frequent elec-
tions (e.g. every third year) where all residents above a certain 
age are entitled to vote for independent candidates through 
secret ballots would promote leaders’ accountability towards 
their constituencies. 
Third, CBNRM initiatives should ensure that key management 
functions and decisions are shared among and monitored 
by all the members of the management committee and 
ultimately the constituency. This would counter the concen-
tration of unchecked powers in the hands of one leader. 
Mandatory record keeping, public auditing and procedures to 
oust leaders who abuse their public mandates are important 
measures in this regard.
Fourth, CBNRM initiatives should bring marginalized groups 
into contact with equity promoting third parties such as gov-
ernment institutions or independent NGOs. The engagement 
of a third party may promote inclusion and equal status of 
the marginalized in decision-making processes, strengthen 
their capacity to resist unfair operational rules and claim a fair 
share of benefits. 
For more information about the study and its results, please 
refer to Saito-Jensen et al. (2010). 
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